Minsk Agreement and why it failed

In the annals of failed diplomacy, few documents are as pivotal, well-intentioned, and ultimately futile as the Minsk Agreements. They are the ghost at the feast of the Ukraine war—a constant reference point for what could have been, a tool for blame-shifting, and a masterclass in how irreconcilable interpretations can render a peace deal dead on arrival.

To understand the full-scale invasion of 2022, one must understand the collapse of Minsk. This was not a single failed meeting but a seven-year saga of broken ceasefires, bad faith, and a fundamental paradox that made their implementation impossible from the very start.

Act I: The Desperate Push for a Ceasefire (2014-2015)

The context for Minsk was the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the sudden eruption of a bloody separatist uprising in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine in April 2014. Fueled by Russian volunteers, military advisors, and a steady flow of weapons, pro-Russian forces captured key cities like Donetsk and Luhansk. Ukraine’s military, caught unprepared and weakened by years of corruption, launched an “Anti-Terrorist Operation” (ATO) that struggled to regain control.

By late summer 2014, with Ukrainian forces on the back foot after a disastrous defeat at Ilovaisk, there was urgent international pressure to stop the bleeding. This led to the first agreement, negotiated in the Belarusian capital under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the trilateral “Normandy Format” (Ukraine, Russia, Germany, and France).

Minsk I (September 2014) was a classic, immediate ceasefire agreement. Its key points included:

• An immediate bilateral ceasefire.
• Decentralization of power in Ukraine (granting some special status to Donbas).
• Monitoring by the OSCE.
• Withdrawal of all foreign armed formations (a clear reference to Russian forces, though never explicitly admitted by Russia).

It failed within days. The fighting never truly stopped. The lines were still fluid, and both sides used the lull to regroup and rearm. The violence escalated again, culminating in a fierce battle for the strategic transport hub of Debaltseve in early 2015. Ukrainian forces were once again encircled and defeated, forcing them back to the negotiating table from a position of severe weakness.

The result was Minsk II (February 12, 2015), a more detailed and complex 13-point plan. This is the agreement that would become the holy grail—and the poison pill—of European diplomacy for the next seven years.

The Devil in the Details: The 13 Points of Minsk II

Minsk II was not just a ceasefire; it was a proposed roadmap for a political settlement. Its most critical provisions were:

1. An immediate and comprehensive ceasefire.
2. Withdrawal of all heavy weapons by both sides to create a security zone.
3. OSCE monitoring of the ceasefire and withdrawal.
4. A dialogue on interim self-government for the Donbas in accordance with Ukrainian law (the “Special Status” law).
5. A pardon and amnesty for those involved in the fighting.
6. An exchange of all hostages and prisoners.
7. Humanitarian assistance.
8. Restoration of full social and economic links (e.g., payment of pensions, reopening of banks).
9. Reinstatement of Ukrainian control over its state border with Russia throughout the conflict zone. Crucially, this was to occur only after point 11 (constitutional reform) was fulfilled.
10. Withdrawal of all foreign armed formations, weapons, and mercenaries.
11. Constitutional reform in Ukraine granting decentralization and enacting the “Special Status” for Donbas permanently.
12. Elections in Donetsk and Luhansk under Ukrainian law and OSCE monitoring.
13. Intensifying the work of the Trilateral Contact Group (Ukraine, Russia, OSCE).

On paper, it was a comprehensive plan. In practice, it contained a time bomb disguised as a sequence of events.

The Catch-22: The Irreconcilable Sequence

The fatal flaw of Minsk II was the order of operations, which created two utterly incompatible interpretations:

The Ukrainian (and Western) Interpretation:

1. First, a complete ceasefire.
2. Russia withdraws its forces and weapons.
3. Ukraine regains full control of its international border with Russia.
4. Then, and only then, would Ukraine hold local elections and grant special status, under Ukrainian law and with legitimate, non-armed political parties participating. This would restore Ukrainian sovereignty before making political concessions.

The Russian and Separatist Interpretation:

1. First, Ukraine must amend its constitution to grant Donbas broad autonomy (“special status”) and formalize it. This would effectively give Russia a permanent veto over Ukrainian foreign policy (e.g., NATO membership) through its proxies in the Donbas parliament.
2. Then, elections must be held in the territory as it was—under the control of Russian-backed militias and with no Ukrainian political parties allowed to campaign freely.
3. Then, and only then, would Russia consider allowing Ukraine to control the border. This would mean Ukraine was forced to legitimize Russian proxies before regaining sovereignty, effectively locking in Russian influence permanently.

This was the impossible paradox. For Ukraine, implementing the political clauses first was national suicide, sacrificing its sovereignty to the very forces that had torn it apart. For Russia, allowing Ukraine to retake the border first would mean losing all its leverage and abandoning the separatist entities it had spent blood and treasure to create.

Why It Failed: A Multifaceted Collapse

With this fundamental disagreement at its core, the agreement was doomed. The subsequent years simply exposed and widened the cracks:

1. A “Frozen Conflict” by Design: Many analysts argue Russia never wanted Minsk to succeed. Its goal was to create a permanent, simmering conflict within Ukraine—a “frozen” one like in Transnistria or Georgia. This would destabilize Ukraine from within, prevent its integration into NATO and the EU, and give Russia a constant lever of influence. Implementing peace would remove that lever.
2. Continuous Violations on the Ground: The ceasefire in name only. The line of contact remained one of the most violent in Europe, with thousands of soldiers and civilians dying in the “quiet” years between 2015 and 2022. The constant shelling and sniper fire made the idea of free and fair elections absurd.
3. The Problem of “Legitimization”: For Kyiv, holding elections under the guns of Russian proxies would legitimize terrorist organizations. It would allow Moscow to install its puppets in the Ukrainian parliament, creating a Trojan horse that would forever paralyze the country’s pro-Western trajectory.
4. Lack of a Credible Enforcer: The OSCE monitoring mission was brave and diligent, but it was utterly powerless. It had no mandate to enforce peace, only to observe and report. It was routinely denied access, shot at, and its reports of Russian weaponry crossing the border were ignored by the Kremlin. The Normandy Format leaders—Merkel and Macron—could apply diplomatic pressure, but they had no leverage to force Putin’s hand if he chose to be obstructive.
5. The “All or Nothing” Trap: The agreement was a package deal. Because no single point could be moved forward without consensus on the sequence, the entire process was stuck. Small, practical steps like prisoner exchanges (which did happen occasionally) were the only glimmers of progress, but they could not unlock the larger political deadlock.

The Ghost and the Invasion

By 2021, the Minsk process was a zombie—formally alive but brain-dead. Ukraine grew increasingly frustrated with Western pressure to make concessions it saw as existential threats. Russia grew impatient with what it portrayed as Ukrainian obstinance.

When Vladimir Putin recognized the independence of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics on February 21, 2022, he didn’t just violate the Minsk Agreements; he set fire to them. The full-scale invasion three days later was the ultimate admission that the diplomatic path he had never truly embraced was over. For him, if Ukraine would not become a subordinate ally via Minsk, it would be forced to become one by force.

The failure of the Minsk Agreements is a stark lesson in the limits of diplomacy when faced with an actor negotiating in bad faith. It shows how a document designed to create peace can instead become a weapon of war, a smokescreen for military consolidation, and a prelude to a far greater catastrophe. Its legacy is the war it failed to prevent and a warning that the most dangerous agreements are those where all parties sign their name but believe in entirely different truths.