How did the Marathas lose the Third Battle of Panipat?

The Third Battle of Panipat, fought on January 14, 1761, became a turning point in Indian history and put an end to the expansionist dreams of the Maratha Empire. This fierce and bloody battle was fought between the Maratha confederacy led by Sadashivrao Bhau and the invading Afghan army of Ahmed Shah Abdali (also known as Ahmed Shah Durrani).

While the Marathas were one of the most daring powers in 18th-century India, their crushing defeat at Panipat opened up cracks in their military, political and strategic structure. This defeat not only halted their rise but also created a power vacuum that could eventually be filled by the British. Understanding how the Marathas lost this battle involves observing a mix of strategic miscalculations, logistics failures, management choices and political isolation.

By the mid-18th century, the Marathas had expanded their territory far beyond Maharashtra, with influence stretching from the Deccan to parts of the north, including Delhi and Punjab. But, this large territorial expansion made their empire difficult to manage and defend. When Ahmad Shah Abdali invaded India in 1759 and marched towards Delhi, the Marathas chose to confront him in unfamiliar terrain, hundreds of miles from their home base.

Their decision to fight at Panipat, deep in north India, was an ambitious but ultimately flawed move. They underestimated the challenges of maintaining a large army so far from their logistical heartland, and they overestimated the support they would receive from neighboring rulers and allies. Political isolation and absence of allies

An important reason for the Marathas’ defeat was their political isolation. Despite being a major power in India, the Marathas did not form meaningful alliances with the various neighboring powers in north India. Rajputs, Jats, Sikhs and the declining Mughal court all viewed the Marathas with suspicion or hostility, often due to past conflicts and the Marathas’ aggressive expansionist policies.

Their failure to form a united front against a foreign invader like Abdali became an overlooked possibility. In comparison, Ahmad Shah Abdali had the support of neighbouring Muslim rulers like Shuja-ud-Daula of Awadh and Najib-ud-Daula of Rohilkhand, who provided him with crucial aid and manpower.

Another fundamental factor that contributed to the Marathas’ defeat was the disastrous state of their logistics. Sadashivrao Bhau led an army of over 100,000 soldiers, including cavalry, infantry, artillery and camp fans. Such a massive thrust required a well-thought-out delivery chain, especially in unfavorable terrain.

But, as the Marathas marched north, their supply lines grew thin. When they settled in Panipat, they were cut off from their southern base, and Abdali’s forces effectively surrounded them, blocking reinforcements and reinforcements. Hunger, disease, and low morale plagued the Maratha camp. This long and volatile siege weakened their troops even before the battle began.

Sadashivrao Bhau, even though a brave and capable general, lacked experience in the style of warfare suitable for the North Indian plains. His approach to warfare was more suited to the Deccan region, and was not adapted to the realities of fighting against Abdali’s experienced cavalry and the swift Afghan advance. In addition, the Marathas relied heavily on their artillery, led by the successful Ibrahim Khan Gardi, but the terrain and lack of mobility limited its effectiveness.

However, the Afghan army took advantage of light cavalry and mobile artillery to make short and devastating attacks. During the final battle, Bhau made the fateful decision to launch a full-scale frontal assault after being exhausted by months of siege. This led to heavy casualties among many in the Maratha ranks and the battle became disorganized.

Another neglected factor was internal dissension within the Maratha camp. There was tension between particular factions, including Pune-based Peshwa supporters and local leaders such as Malharrao Holkar and Scindia. These divisions hindered coordinated decision-making and lowered overall morale. Additionally, the large number of non-combatant parties, such as families and servants who watched the army, made mobility difficult and likewise created logistical strains. Conditions in the camp became steadily more dismal, weakening the fighting power of the navy even before the decisive clash began.

The Third Battle of Panipat was no longer just a naval defeat for the Marathas – it became a psychological and political disaster. Over 50,000 Maratha soldiers were killed, including Sadashivrao Bhau and Vishwasrao, the Peshwa’s son. The defeat shattered the mystique of the invincibility of the Maratha confederacy and left north India vulnerable to external and internal instability.

Even though the Marathas re-emerged in the south and regained power in the following years, the defeat at Panipat forever changed the course of Indian history, paving the way for British dominance. The battle is a reminder of how an army, without political unity and strategic foresight, can falter against a well-coordinated and determined opponent.