The Kargil War of 1999 is remembered as one of the most intense and high-altitude conflicts between India and Pakistan since independence. While the visible face of the war featured fierce military battles between the Indian Army and Pakistani intruders in the rugged Kargil sector of Jammu and Kashmir, a shadowy force operated behind the scenes — Pakistan’s notorious spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
Though the Pakistani military leadership, particularly General Pervez Musharraf, has often been credited (or blamed) for the Kargil operation, the role of ISI was both critical and clandestine. This article explores the involvement of Pakistan’s ISI in the Kargil War, highlighting its planning, coordination, strategic failures, and long-term impact on regional security.
The Strategic Context of the Kargil War
The Kargil War broke out in May 1999, just a few months after Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif signed the Lahore Declaration aimed at peaceful relations. But beneath the diplomacy, elements within the Pakistani military and ISI were secretly planning the Kargil infiltration, which would eventually lead to full-blown war.
The objective was to:
- Occupy Indian territory across the Line of Control (LoC) in Kargil.
- Cut off National Highway 1A, the lifeline to Leh and Siachen.
- Internationalize the Kashmir dispute by escalating military tensions.
The operation was not just a military move — it was a strategic intelligence operation, orchestrated with full ISI support and participation.
ISI’s Role in Planning Operation Badr
The infiltration plan, dubbed Operation Badr, was drafted and executed largely by the Pakistan Army’s Northern Command with heavy input and logistical support from the ISI.
Key elements of ISI’s involvement:
- Identifying strategic points along the LoC for infiltration, particularly remote and unmanned ridgelines.
- Using intelligence assets and local informants to understand Indian Army patrol routes and surveillance patterns.
- Coordinating with Mujahideen and irregular forces, many of whom were trained by the ISI in prior years.
Though the ISI operates outside the formal military structure, its close ties to the Pakistan Army’s GHQ allowed it to act as a crucial enabler of the Kargil plan.
Covert Infiltration: Use of Militants Disguised as Locals
A major component of the ISI strategy was to use militants and Pakistani soldiers disguised as Kashmiri insurgents. This would allow Pakistan to deny direct military involvement in the initial stages and maintain plausible deniability.
Tactics included:
- Deploying trained ISI-linked jihadist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, in the guise of freedom fighters.
- Supporting these units with logistics, supplies, and communication channels managed by ISI handlers.
- Leveraging civilian networks in Gilgit-Baltistan for intelligence and terrain navigation.
However, this ruse collapsed when the Indian Army recovered bodies of regular Pakistani soldiers with identity papers and Pakistani military insignia — exposing the ISI-military nexus.
Misinformation and Media Manipulation
The ISI has a long history of psychological warfare and propaganda operations, and during the Kargil War, it attempted to:
- Spread misinformation to the Pakistani public, denying military involvement and portraying infiltrators as Kashmiri freedom fighters.
- Influence international opinion by misrepresenting the conflict as a Kashmiri uprising rather than cross-border aggression.
- Use friendly media outlets and state-run broadcasters to spread a carefully curated narrative.
However, India’s diplomatic counter-offensive, backed by clear battlefield evidence, eventually convinced the global community of Pakistan’s direct involvement — and by extension, the ISI’s central role.
Conflict with Pakistan’s Civilian Government
One of the least known but significant aspects of ISI’s involvement in the Kargil War was the lack of coordination with Pakistan’s civilian leadership.
- Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was reportedly kept in the dark about the full scale of the operation.
- The plan was conceived by General Musharraf, then Pakistan Army Chief, with backing from ISI Director General Lt. Gen. Ziauddin Butt and a select circle of top military leaders.
- The ISI bypassed both parliamentary oversight and foreign ministry involvement, effectively hijacking the country’s military and foreign policy.
This civil-military disconnect created deep divisions within Pakistan and ultimately led to the military coup by Musharraf in October 1999.
Intelligence Failures on Both Sides
While the ISI was executing the operation, it also made critical miscalculations:
- It underestimated India’s military response and the capability of Indian forces to recapture high-altitude peaks.
- ISI wrongly believed that international pressure would force India to negotiate, but India chose to launch a full-scale counter-offensive instead.
- Pakistan’s expectations of U.S. intervention on its behalf fell flat when President Bill Clinton sided with India, especially after evidence of Pakistani army regulars was presented.
India, too, suffered an initial intelligence failure in detecting the infiltrations — a lapse that led to major internal reforms in its intelligence coordination post-Kargil.
Aftermath: ISI’s Reputation Takes a Hit
The Kargil War was a strategic disaster for Pakistan, and the ISI was heavily criticized even within military circles for:
- Overreliance on a covert plan without a clear exit strategy
- Poor coordination between intelligence and operational units
- Causing diplomatic isolation and global embarrassment
Post-Kargil, ISI reportedly shifted focus back to asymmetric warfare, strengthening ties with non-state actors and insurgent groups in Kashmir — a decision that continues to haunt regional security even today.
Impact on Indo-Pak Relations
The ISI’s role in the Kargil War further deepened mistrust between India and Pakistan. Even peace efforts like:
- Agra Summit (2001)
- Composite Dialogue process
- Track II diplomacy
have repeatedly broken down due to cross-border terrorism widely believed to be ISI-sponsored, including:
- 2001 Indian Parliament attack
- 2008 Mumbai attacks
- 2016 Uri attack
Kargil became a blueprint for future ISI-backed proxy conflicts, proving that the agency remained committed to its “thousand cuts” doctrine against India.
Conclusion
The ISI’s involvement in the Kargil War reveals how powerful intelligence agencies can shape national military agendas, often without democratic accountability or strategic foresight. From planning infiltration routes to managing propaganda and recruiting militants, the ISI played a shadowy but central role in one of South Asia’s most dangerous conflicts.
While the immediate war lasted only a few months, its legacy — of deception, military overreach, and failed strategic gambits — continues to influence the geopolitical landscape of the subcontinent.
Understanding the ISI’s role in the Kargil War is not just about looking at the past; it’s about recognizing the real risks posed by unaccountable intelligence operations in regions already steeped in conflict.