The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is more than just a collection of infrastructure projects; it is the cornerstone of Pakistan’s economic ambitions and a pivotal strand in China’s vast Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Representing investments of over $60 billion, it promises to be a game-changer, with its network of roads, power plants, and the strategic Gwadar Port. Yet, from its inception, CPEC has faced a persistent and formidable challenge: security.
The primary threats are well-documented: ethno-nationalist insurgencies in Balochistan, which see CPEC as a tool of exploitation, and the persistent menace of terrorist groups like the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its splinter factions. To counter these threats, Pakistan has employed a multi-layered security approach, from raising dedicated military divisions to constructing secure enclaves. However, the alleged covert campaign known as Operation Sindoor introduces a complex and controversial dimension to this security calculus. The critical question is: did this shadow war enhance CPEC’s security or inadvertently make it more vulnerable?
To answer this, we must first move beyond a simple “good vs. bad” framework and analyze the operation’s impact through the lenses of immediate tactical gains and long-term strategic risks.
The Argument For: How Sindoor May Have Bolstered CPEC Security
Proponents and analysts who might justify a campaign like Sindoor would argue that it served CPEC’s interests in several key ways:
- Decapitating the Threat at its Source: The most direct benefit was the targeted removal of individuals actively plotting attacks against CPEC assets. By focusing on masterminds, bomb-makers, and financiers of groups like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and TTP, the operation aimed to disrupt attack cycles before they could be executed. This isn’t merely about retaliation; it’s about pre-emption. A successfully eliminated planner could prevent a catastrophic attack on a convoy of Chinese engineers or a suicide bombing at a Gwadar facility, thereby saving lives, protecting billions in assets, and maintaining project timelines.
- Creating a Deterrent Effect: Covert actions like Sindoor send a powerful, chilling message to anti-state militants: nowhere is safe. The mysterious, unpredictable nature of such operations breeds paranoia and distrust within militant ranks. This can disrupt recruitment, hinder communication, and force operatives to spend more time on their own security than on planning attacks. For CPEC, this psychological deterrence is a potent, invisible shield. The fear of being next on the list could deter a potential attacker from even attempting to target Chinese interests.
- Demonstrating Resolve to Beijing: China’s primary concern in Pakistan is the safety of its citizens and investments. Period. Any perception of weakness or incompetence in security provision could make Beijing hesitant, delay disbursements of funds, or even lead to a scaling back of projects. A robust, multi-pronged security strategy that includes both overt military patrols and covert intelligence operations demonstrates Pakistan’s unwavering commitment to protecting CPEC. It signals to Beijing that Pakistan is willing to go to any lengths to secure their partnership, thus bolstoring confidence in the long-term viability of the corridor.
The Argument Against: The Strategic Blowback and Long-Term Risks
While the tactical benefits might seem compelling, the strategic repercussions of a campaign like Operation Sindoor potentially created deeper, more insidious threats to CPEC’s security.
- The Martyrdom Narrative and Recruitment Boom: This is the most significant risk. Targeted killings, particularly those that are extrajudicial, can transform obscure militants into powerful martyrs. Their deaths can be leveraged by insurgent groups for powerful propaganda, fueling resentment and painting the state as a brutal occupier. This narrative is incredibly effective for recruitment. A 2019 report by the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) noted that narratives of state oppression are a primary driver for young Baloch men joining separatist groups. Therefore, while Sindoor may have removed a few high-value targets in the short term, it may have inadvertently swelled the ranks of the very groups it sought to defeat, creating a larger pool of attackers for the future.
- Splintering and Radicalization of Militant Groups: Decapitating a structured militant organization doesn’t always destroy it; sometimes, it shatters it into smaller, more radical, and less predictable splinter groups. These new factions, free from the sometimes-restraining influence of older leadership, often compete to prove their lethality by launching more audacious and brutal attacks. The security apparatus, which may have understood the modus operandi of a known group, now faces a fragmented and evolving threat landscape that is far harder to predict and counter. This directly endangers CPEC sites with a more volatile and unpredictable threat.
- International Scrutiny and Reputational Damage: As reports of extrajudicial actions seep into international media—as seen with publications like the The Indian Express—it attracts negative attention from human rights organizations (e.g., Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch) and foreign governments. This can lead to calls for investigations and cast a shadow over the CPEC project itself. While China may privately appreciate a strong security stance, being publicly associated with a partner accused of human rights violations complicates the optics of the Belt and Road Initiative on the global stage. This reputational risk can indirectly affect investor confidence.
- Diverting Resources from Holistic Security: An over-reliance on a kinetic, covert campaign can divert crucial resources, intelligence focus, and political capital from the more sustainable, albeit slower, solutions to the insurgency. The root causes of the Baloch insurgency, for instance, are deeply tied to grievances over political marginalization and economic inequity. Ultimately, CPEC’s long-term security depends not just on neutralizing militants, but on winning the hearts and minds of the local population through inclusive development, job creation, and political dialogue. A campaign perceived as brutal can alienate the local population, making them less likely to cooperate with security forces and thus undermining the very foundation of lasting security.
Conclusion: A Pyrrhic Victory?
The impact of Operation Sindoor on CPEC security is a tale of two timelines. In the short term, it may have provided crucial breathing room, disrupting imminent plots and demonstrating resolve. It offered a tangible, albeit brutal, response to clear and present dangers.
However, in the long term, the strategy carries the profound risk of being a Pyrrhic victory. By potentially fueling the grievances that drive recruitment, radicalizing militant factions, and damaging the state’s legitimacy, such operations can perpetuate the very cycle of violence they aim to break. The enhanced security today might come at the cost of a more entrenched and virulent insurgency tomorrow.
Therefore, the relationship between covert action and CPEC security is not linear. While it might address the symptoms of the threat—the individual militants—it risks exacerbating the disease itself: the deep-seated discontent and cycle of violence. The ultimate security of CPEC, an project of such monumental importance, likely depends less on shadowy operations and more on the difficult, unglamorous work of addressing political grievances, ensuring equitable distribution of CPEC’s economic benefits, and combining tactical precision with strategic wisdom. The danger lies in winning every covert battle only to find oneself losing the strategic war for a secure and stable Pakistan.