In the early hours of a late November morning in 2008, the city of Mumbai was plunged into a nightmare. For over 60 hours, 10 gunmen from the Pakistan-based terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) unleashed a coordinated attack, killing 166 people and injuring hundreds more. The world watched in horror. India’s grief soon turned to fury, compounded by evidence pointing to state actors within Pakistan providing support to the attackers. The demand for a decisive response was immense. Yet, instead of a conventional military strike, India reportedly chose a path far more shadowy and complex: Operation Sindoor.
While never officially confirmed by the Indian government, numerous investigative reports by major news outlets like The Indian Express describe Operation Sindoor as a covert campaign of targeted killings of wanted terrorists on foreign soil—specifically in Pakistan. The operation allegedly involved intelligence agencies employing local criminals or proxies to eliminate high-value targets associated with the Mumbai attacks and other anti-India jihadist groups.
This strategy immediately plunges us into a contentious and murky debate: Did Operation Sindoor violate international law? The answer is not a simple yes or no, but a fascinating navigation through the grey zones where espionage, sovereignty, and the modern war on terror violently intersect.
The Legal Framework: Sovereignty and Extraterritorial Force
At its core, international law is built on the principle of sovereign equality of states, enshrined in the United Nations Charter. Article 2(4) prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Furthermore, Article 51 provides the only widely accepted exception: the right to self-defence against an armed attack.
The first and most straightforward legal objection to operations like Sindoor is the violation of Pakistani sovereignty. Conducting lethal military or paramilitary operations on another state’s territory without its consent is a clear breach of international law. It is an act of aggression, an affront to the target state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force within its borders. Pakistan would have a compelling legal case to protest such actions as unlawful violations of its territorial integrity.
The Self-Defence Argument: A Justification for Covert Action?
India’s potential legal justification would rest squarely on Article 51: the right to self-defence. The argument would proceed as follows:
- The Armed Attack: The Mumbai attacks were a severe, cross-border armed attack by a non-state actor (LeT) that originated from Pakistani territory.
- The Unwilling or Unable Doctrine: India could argue that Pakistan was either “unwilling or unable” to take effective action against the terrorists on its soil. Despite being provided with dossiers of evidence, Pakistan’s actions against LeT leadership were seen by India as slow, insufficient, and often perfunctory.
- Necessity and Proportionality: The response—targeting specific individuals directly responsible for planning and executing attacks—could be framed as a necessary and proportional act of self-defence. It is not an invasion or an attack on the Pakistani state or military, but a surgical strike against the very perpetrators of the initial armed attack.
This is where the legal waters become muddied. The “unwilling or unable” doctrine is highly controversial and not universally accepted in international law. Many nations and legal scholars reject it, fearing it creates a dangerous loophole for powerful states to violate the sovereignty of weaker ones under the pretext of fighting terrorism. It sets a precarious precedent.
Furthermore, for self-defence to be legal, it must be immediate. Operation Sindoor, as reported, was not a one-off retaliatory strike but a prolonged campaign spanning years. This stretches the concept of “self-defence” from an immediate reaction into a continuous, peacetime policy, moving it further away from accepted legal norms.
Targeted Killings and International Human Rights Law
Beyond the jus ad bellum (law of going to war) question, we must consider the jus in bello (law in war)—the rules governing the conduct of operations.
If a state of armed conflict exists between India and LeT (a non-international armed conflict), the rules of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) apply. IHL permits the targeting of combatants and, in certain contexts, fighters who are directly participating in hostilities. If the individuals targeted were actively planning future attacks, they could be considered legitimate targets under IHL, and their killing would not be unlawful.
However, if there is no recognized armed conflict—if this is considered a counter-terrorism operation during peacetime—then International Human Rights Law (IHRL) applies. IHRL strictly governs the use of lethal force by state agents. Force is only permissible where strictly necessary to protect life, making lethal intent a last resort. A policy of premeditated, intentional killing without attempt at capture, trial, or due process on foreign soil is almost certainly a violation of the target’s right to life under human rights law.
This is the critical dilemma: India would likely argue it is in an armed conflict with LeT, applying IHL. Critics and human rights organizations would argue that a covert campaign in urban Pakistan falls under IHRL, where such killings are illegal extraterritorial executions.
The Espionage Defence and the “Grey Zone”
This is where the covert nature of Operation Sindoor becomes its own defence. Espionage, while itself illegal under the domestic laws of the target country, exists in a peculiar space in international law. It is not expressly prohibited by international treaty law. States routinely spy on each other, and while it is a violation of sovereignty, the response is typically diplomatic expulsion, not a legal case at the International Court of Justice.
By using proxies and maintaining strict plausible deniability, India could attempt to shield itself from direct state responsibility. If a killing is carried out by a local criminal, it’s a domestic murder case for Pakistan to solve, not an unambiguous act of war by India. This is the ultimate “grey zone” tactic: operating below the threshold of a formal act of aggression that would trigger a full-scale war, while still achieving strategic objectives.
Conclusion: A Precedent of Perilous Pragmatism
So, did Operation Sindoor violate international law? From the perspective of sovereignty, almost certainly yes. From the perspective of a strict interpretation of human rights law, again, yes. Its justification under the right to self-defence is highly contentious and rests on a disputed legal doctrine.
However, the practice reveals a harsh reality of modern geopolitics. For states like India, facing persistent terrorist threats from non-state actors based in hostile neighbouring states, the options are bleak: launch a full-scale war with catastrophic consequences, do nothing and appear weak, or engage in covert action that exists in a legal grey zone.
Operations like Sindoor are born from a sense of frustration with the limitations of international law, which is fundamentally designed to manage conflicts between states, not a state’s fight against a diffuse terrorist network sheltered by a state. They represent a perilous form of pragmatism—a way to deliver justice and deter future attacks without triggering a broader conflict.
The greatest danger lies in the precedent. If one nation can justify extraterritorial targeted killings, what is to stop others from doing the same? The very international legal order designed to prevent chaos and uphold sovereignty is weakened each time a nation acts as judge, jury, and executioner on another’s soil. Operation Sindoor, therefore, is not just a historical case study but a stark warning of the challenges international law faces in an era of shadow wars and stateless threats.