India and Pakistan are two nuclear-armed neighbors with a history of conflict, border tensions, and contrasting military doctrines. Among the most significant differences is India’s declared No-First-Use (NFU) nuclear policy, which starkly contrasts with Pakistan’s first-use nuclear strategy.
This contrast in nuclear postures not only shapes strategic calculations on both sides but also impacts regional stability, crisis escalation risks, and global non-proliferation debates.
In this article, we explore:
- What is India’s NFU policy?
- How does Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine differ?
- Implications of these postures on regional security.
- Global perspectives on NFU.
- Challenges and evolving debates.
What Is India’s No-First-Use (NFU) Nuclear Policy?
India adopted its NFU policy after conducting nuclear tests in 1998 (Pokhran-II). The Indian Nuclear Doctrine released in 2003 reaffirmed the core principle:
“India will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike but will respond with punitive retaliation in case of a nuclear attack.”
Key features of India’s NFU doctrine:
- Credible minimum deterrence: India maintains just enough nuclear capability to deter an enemy, not for aggression.
- Massive retaliation: If attacked with nuclear weapons, India promises a response that is “massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.”
- Civilian control: Nuclear command rests with the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) under the Prime Minister.
- Non-use against non-nuclear states: India commits not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-armed countries.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture: A First-Use Threat
Unlike India, Pakistan has never adopted an NFU policy. Its nuclear strategy revolves around the possibility of first use, even against conventional threats from India.
Key aspects of Pakistan’s nuclear policy:
- Deterrence by ambiguity: Pakistan refuses to declare a red line, keeping India guessing.
- Tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs): Pakistan developed battlefield nuclear weapons like the Nasr missile to counter India’s conventional superiority.
- Doctrine of full-spectrum deterrence: Includes long-range, medium-range, and tactical capabilities aimed at both countervalue (cities) and counterforce (military assets) targets.
Pakistan’s stance is rooted in its perception that India’s superior conventional forces could defeat it in a traditional war, prompting the need for nuclear deterrence at all levels.
Historical Context: The 1998 Nuclear Tests
Both India and Pakistan became overt nuclear powers in May 1998, with a series of tit-for-tat tests at Pokhran and Chagai, respectively.
While India tested five devices under Operation Shakti, Pakistan responded with six tests days later. These developments changed the regional security architecture forever.
Immediately after the tests, India voluntarily declared its No-First-Use policy, signaling restraint and responsibility. Pakistan, however, cited the need for strategic flexibility, especially considering its view of India as a conventional threat.
Kargil War (1999): Nuclear Tensions Tested
Just a year after the tests, the Kargil conflict brought the two nuclear-armed nations to the brink.
While neither side used nuclear weapons, the crisis:
- Tested the credibility of nuclear deterrence.
- Showed how conflict under the nuclear threshold is possible.
- Raised concerns about escalation risks, particularly from Pakistan’s side due to its ambiguous doctrine.
India’s NFU policy held strong during the crisis, reaffirming its commitment to strategic restraint.
Balakot Airstrikes (2019): The New Era of Conventional-Nuclear Balance
The 2019 Balakot airstrikes by India in response to the Pulwama terror attack tested regional military thresholds again.
Despite fears of escalation:
- India conducted precision conventional strikes across the border.
- Pakistan responded with airspace incursions but not with nuclear saber-rattling.
This episode demonstrated that India’s NFU policy allows it to carry out limited conventional retaliation, without triggering nuclear conflict—unless Pakistan escalates first.
NFU vs First Use: Strategic Implications
1. Crisis Stability
India’s NFU posture promotes stability by lowering preemptive strike incentives. Pakistan’s first-use policy increases unpredictability and risk of rapid escalation.
2. Deterrence Credibility
Pakistan’s doctrine is designed to deter India’s conventional military power. India’s doctrine focuses on credible deterrence through retaliation, not aggression.
3. Command and Control
NFU allows India to maintain strict civilian control and centralized command, while Pakistan’s readiness for first use may require decentralized or forward-deployed weapons, increasing risks of miscalculation or unauthorized launch.
4. Arms Race Dynamics
Pakistan’s doctrine fuels an arms race in tactical nukes, while India’s NFU allows more predictable, limited modernization.
Debates Within India: Rethinking NFU?
In recent years, some Indian policymakers and strategists have questioned the relevance of NFU, especially considering:
- Pakistan’s use of terrorism as a proxy war tool.
- Development of tactical nuclear weapons by Pakistan.
- Changing regional threats, including a two-front scenario with China.
In 2019, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh hinted that India’s NFU policy might be reconsidered in the future, saying:
“Till today, our nuclear policy is ‘No First Use’. What happens in the future depends on the circumstances.”
Though not an official policy shift, this statement generated significant speculation about India’s evolving nuclear doctrine.
Global Perception: NFU as a Responsible Doctrine
India’s NFU policy has earned it global recognition as a responsible nuclear power, despite not being a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Benefits include:
- Greater international diplomatic support.
- Entry into export control regimes like MTCR, Wassenaar Arrangement, and Australia Group.
- Moral high ground in nuclear non-proliferation debates.
Pakistan’s first-use policy, by contrast, is often viewed as destabilizing, especially due to its lack of transparency and ties to state-sponsored terrorism.
Risks of Miscalculation: The Role of NFU
One of the greatest dangers in South Asia is a nuclear miscalculation during a crisis. NFU policies help:
- Reduce the risk of preemptive attacks.
- Ensure more time for diplomacy and de-escalation.
- Promote nuclear stability during limited conflicts.
Pakistan’s first-use policy, with its emphasis on tactical nukes, lowers the threshold for nuclear use and increases the danger of accidental or misjudged escalation.
The China Factor: India’s Two-Front Challenge
India’s NFU policy was originally designed keeping Pakistan in mind, but with rising military tensions with China, especially after the 2020 Galwan clashes, India faces a two-front strategic threat.
China also maintains a No-First-Use policy, but questions remain about its military doctrine in Tibet and the Indo-Pacific.
There are growing calls within India to:
- Rethink NFU in a two-front war context.
- Enhance survivability of nuclear assets.
- Invest in second-strike capabilities and early warning systems.
Conclusion: NFU as a Pillar of Stability—or an Outdated Doctrine?
India’s No-First-Use nuclear policy stands in sharp contrast to Pakistan’s first-use posture, representing a clash of strategic philosophies—stability through restraint vs deterrence through ambiguity.
While India’s NFU doctrine projects responsibility and enhances crisis stability, evolving threats from Pakistan’s tactical nukes and cross-border terrorism have sparked debate about whether NFU still serves India’s long-term interests.
For now, NFU remains a cornerstone of India’s nuclear posture, reinforcing its image as a peaceful, status-quo power. But with changing geopolitical realities, future governments may find it pragmatic to keep their options open—just like Pakistan always has.