Will Ukraine join NATO after the war?

The blue and yellow flag of Ukraine has become a global symbol of resilience, courage, and a fierce desire to anchor itself in the community of democratic nations. This aspiration is codified in the nation’s constitution: its strategic course towards full integration into the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. For Ukraine, NATO membership is not just a policy goal; it is envisioned as the ultimate security guarantee, a final break from a colonial past, and a definitive shield against future Russian aggression.

Yet, the question of if and when Ukraine will actually join the alliance after the war is one of the most complex and consequential geopolitical puzzles of our time. It is a issue tangled in a web of military realities, political calculations, moral imperatives, and strategic risks. The path is not a straight line from the battlefield to the membership table; it is a minefield of prerequisites, objections, and compromises. The answer lies at the intersection of what is just, what is possible, and what is prudent.

The Unshakable Why: Ukraine’s Case for Membership

To understand the drive behind Ukraine’s bid, one must view it from Kyiv’s perspective. The arguments for membership are powerful and, from a moral standpoint, overwhelmingly persuasive.

1. The Bloody Down Payment: No nation in history has fought a more direct and brutal war against a security threat that NATO was specifically designed to deter. Ukrainian soldiers are not just defending their homeland; they are de facto defending NATO’s eastern flank, degrading the military power of the alliance’s primary adversary at an unimaginable cost in blood and treasure. The argument goes: such a sacrifice deserves the ultimate security guarantee. Membership is not a handout; it is earned compensation for services rendered to Euro-Atlantic security.
2. The Only Durable Guarantee: Ukraine had security assurances before. The 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Ukraine gave up the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for security assurances from Russia, the UK, and the US, proved to be tragically worthless. For Ukraine, neutrality is now synonymous with vulnerability. After this war, no piece of paper short of the ironclad commitment of Article 5—an attack on one is an attack on all—will be considered sufficient. They have learned that their security cannot be outsourced to the goodwill of others; it must be institutionalized.
3. Anchoring Democratic Reforms: The desire for NATO membership is intrinsically linked to a broader societal project. The pro-Western Maidan Revolution of 2014 was a rejection of corruption and Kremlin influence. NATO membership is seen as the ultimate tool to lock in pro-Western, democratic, and anti-corruption reforms. The rigorous standards of the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) would provide an external framework to force through difficult internal changes, ensuring Ukraine emerges from the war not just victorious, but transformed into a modern, transparent European state.

The Daunting How: The Mountain of Prerequisites

Even with a victorious end to the war, Ukraine’s accession would not be automatic. It would face a long and arduous process with significant hurdles.

1. The Military Prong: Demobilization and Modernization
A post-war Ukrainian military will be the most battle-hardened and experienced in Europe. However, it will also be exhausted, depleted of equipment, and in need of a fundamental transformation.

• Interoperability: Ukraine’s military is currently a Soviet-legacy system rapidly being integrated with Western technology. Full interoperability with NATO—from communications protocols and logistics chains to command structures and ammunition calibers—requires a complete overhaul. This is a decades-long, astronomically expensive project.
• Defense Industrial Integration: Ukraine’s defense industry would need to be fully integrated into the NATO supply chain, requiring massive standardization.
• The Question of Militias: The integration of volunteer brigades and territorial defense units into a formal, state-controlled command structure compliant with NATO standards would be a sensitive and complex task.

2. The Political Prong: The Good Governance Everest
This is arguably the taller mountain to climb. NATO is not just a military alliance; it is a political one built on shared democratic values.

• Corruption: Despite significant progress since 2014, Ukraine continues to battle systemic corruption. NATO members, particularly those with strong rule-of-law traditions, would be hesitant to extend Article 5 to a nation where defense procurement could be vulnerable to graft, seeing it as a critical security risk. A relentless, verifiable, and successful war on corruption is a non-negotiable prerequisite.
• Political Stability: The post-war period will be incredibly turbulent. The nation will need to manage the reintegration of millions of veterans and displaced persons, oversee the reconstruction of vast destroyed territories, and likely face a deeply complex political landscape. NATO will require evidence of stable, democratic institutions that can withstand this pressure before offering membership.

3. The Territorial Prong: The Elephant in the Room
This is the most legally and politically fraught obstacle. NATO’s founding treaty states that it is “determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.” It also operates on the principle of collective defense for all member territory.

• The Frozen Conflict Trap: What if the war ends not with a clear victory but a frozen conflict, with Russia occupying parts of Ukrainian territory? Could NATO extend membership to a country with an active, ongoing border dispute with a nuclear power? Historically, the alliance has been extremely reluctant to do so, as it would immediately turn a localized dispute into a potential NATO-Russia confrontation. Russia could use a frozen conflict in Donbas or Crimea as a permanent veto over Ukrainian accession.
• The “West-Only” Model?: Some have floated the idea of Ukraine joining with Article 5 only applying to its uncontested territory. This is a non-starter. It would legally create two classes of membership, undermine the very principle of collective defense, and formally cede Ukrainian land, rewarding Russian aggression. No Ukrainian government could ever accept this.

The External Hurdles: The Alliance’s Apprehension

Even if Ukraine clears all its internal hurdles, it must still achieve consensus among 32 (and growing) member states. The political appetite within the alliance is mixed and fraught with strategic anxiety.

1. The Article 5 Anxiety: The core of NATO is Article 5. Members must be confident that every other member is a security asset, not a liability. Some older members, who have enjoyed a “peace dividend” since the end of the Cold War, are wary of instantly adding a nation that has just finished a massive war with Russia. They would fear that admitting Ukraine could make NATO less secure by immediately placing it on a permanent war footing, requiring a massive and permanent military buildup on the new border. The question is not just “Does Ukraine deserve it?” but “Does this make us safer?”
2. The German Question: Germany has historically been a cautious voice, prioritizing dialogue with Russia and energy relations. While Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s “Zeitenwende” (sea change) marked a dramatic shift in policy, Berlin’s deep-seated cultural and political aversion to leading the charge into a direct confrontation with Russia remains. Germany would likely be a voice for a very long, conditions-based roadmap, demanding ironclad guarantees on reforms and a stable peace before taking the final step.
3. The Hungarian Wild Card: NATO operates by consensus. A single “no” vote can block membership. Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, with his close ties to Vladimir Putin, has consistently undermined EU and NATO unity regarding Ukraine. He could easily use Hungary’s veto as a bargaining chip to extract concessions from Brussels or simply to appease Moscow, holding Ukraine’s future hostage for his own political ends.

The Russian Factor: The Persistent Threat

Russia’s stance is simple and has been for decades: Ukrainian membership in NATO is a red line that justifies war. While the 2022 invasion has made this argument morally bankrupt in the West, it does not change the strategic reality.

• A Permanent Casus Belli? Even after a ceasefire, a Russia under any leadership is likely to view NATO expansion into Ukraine as an existential threat. Admitting Ukraine could permanently eliminate any prospect of a stable long-term relationship with Russia and ensure a new, even more dangerous Cold War.
• The Deterrence Argument: The counter-argument is that a NATO Ukraine is the only thing that will ultimately deter Russia. The lesson of the past decade is that Putin only understands strength. A powerful Ukraine, backed by the full force of Article 5, would create a stable deterrence and finally end Russian imperial ambitions towards its neighbor. The risk of not admitting Ukraine, proponents argue, is greater—it signals to Moscow that aggression can be rewarded with a veto over its neighbors’ sovereignty.

Conclusion: A Generational Project, Not a Post-War Prize

The tragic and undeniable truth is that Ukraine’s membership in NATO is not a decision for the day after the war ends. It is the destination of a journey that will likely take a decade or more.

The most plausible scenario is a phased, conditional process:

1. An Interim Security Guarantee: The immediate post-war period will see a bilateral or multilateral security pact between key nations (the US, UK, France, Poland) and Ukraine. This would provide a powerful, but not Article 5-level, security assurance to deter renewed aggression during the transition.
2. Intensified Partnership: Ukraine’s status as a NATO partner will be elevated to an unprecedented level, with deeper integration, joint exercises, and continued military funding to rebuild its forces to NATO standards.
3. The Membership Action Plan (MAP): Once stringent political and military reform benchmarks are met, Ukraine would likely be granted a MAP. This is the formal preparation process, a probationary period that could last many years.
4. The Final Decision: The invitation to join will come only when there is a stable peace, resolved territorial integrity (or a clear path to it), and full consensus within NATO that Ukraine is a net security provider, not a risk.

Ukraine’s future is in NATO. The moral and strategic arguments are too powerful to ignore. But the path is a marathon, not a sprint. The alliance will move with the caution of a patient, risk-averse bureaucracy, while Ukraine will push with the urgency of a nation that has bled for its place at the table. Bridging that gap between justified Ukrainian impatience and necessary Atlantic caution will be the greatest diplomatic challenge of the post-war era. The promise of membership must be kept, but it will be fulfilled not in the heat of battle, but in the painstaking, unglamorous work of building a durable peace and a reformed state.